Question One. Whether on Christ’s Soul could have been Conferred the Highest Degree of Grace that could have been Conferred on a Creature

1. About the thirteenth distinction I aska whether there was conferred or could have been conferred on Christ’s soul the supreme degree of grace that could have been conferred on a creature.

a.a [Interpolation] About the thirteenth distinction, where the master determines about the progress of Christ as to his conversation and operation, four questions are asked: first, whether on Christ could have been conferred the supreme degree of grace that could have been conferred on a creature; second, whether there was in fact conferred on Christ the supreme degree of grace that can be conferred on a creature; third, whether it was possible for the will of Christ’s soul to have the highest degree of enjoyment possible for a created nature; fourth, whether Christ’s soul could have enjoyed God in the highest degree without the highest degree of grace. Arguments about the first question:

2. That it was not.

Christ’s soul was not able to receive grace in the highest degree, because it was not the highest intellectual nature; so it was not able to receive the supreme degree of grace. Proof of the consequence: because a more excellent intellectual nature is capable of a greater and more excellent perfection, for capacity for perfection follows the rank of the perfectible nature.

3. On this point it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 9 q.8] that to Christ’s soul was given a certain supernatural habit whereby that nature’s capacity was increased so as to be able to receive greater grace.

4. Against this view [n.3]

A more excellent nature was capable of the same habit or of another more perfect habit and it would, through the latter, be capable of a greater grace; and thus an always more excellent nature is, whether of itself or by habit, capable of more grace than this nature [of Christ’s soul]; and therefore if the proportion for perfection is perfectible [sc. capable of being made more perfect], it can never have the greatest grace that is conferrable or that can be conferred on a creature.

5. Further, this habit should not be conferred on Christ’s soul because grace can be conferred without the habit, and in equal quantity, for grace is a first supernatural act and therefore does not presuppose any other first supernatural act.

6. Further, to the main point: the grace that Christ’s soul could have received would necessarily be finite in its completed state, that is, it would exist in a certain degree, because it exists in completed fact and not in a state of becoming. But a greater grace beyond that degree could be conferred; proof: for although one may suppose grace to exist in some greater degree, one does not thereby suppose it to be infinite, but finite; a finite degree is not repugnant to the perfection of a creature; therefore it is not a contradiction for something to be made more perfect than this creature [sc. Christ’s soul], and this perfection would not be a form in it other than grace, because grace belongs to the highest species among supernatural perfections.

7. Further, if the grace of Christ’s soul were so complete that there could not be a grace altogether greater than it, this would be because of the idea of the form of grace in itself, or because of something on the part of the efficient cause, or because of something on the part of the susceptive cause. Not in the first way because grace is a participation in infinite charity, and so it can grow infinitely before it reaches the limit of the charity it is participating in; not in the second way because the efficient cause is infinite; not in the third way because the form received always increases the capacity of the receiver, for grace enlarges.

8. Further, if Christ’s soul could have creatable grace in its highest degree, then it could have a grace to which no other was equal. The proof of the consequence is that what is said by way of highest abundance belongs to only one thing (Topics 5); the consequent is false, because God could assume another equal human nature or assume an angelic nature and confer on it an equal grace [cf. supra d.1 n.127, d.2 n.27].

9. Argument to the opposite:

This nature [sc. Christ’s soul] was capable of being assumed, as to its existence, into highest union with God;     therefore it was thus capable as to its operation too. The highest union as to operation is by supreme habit of grace alone, which is the principle of operating; therefore etc     .

10. Further, having the capacity for grace belongs to intellectual nature insofar as it is the image of God [Augustine On the Trinity 14.8 n.11]; but this nature [sc. intellectual nature in Christ] was the highest image of God; therefore it was in the highest degree capable of grace; therefore the highest grace was conferred on it.